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Understanding Power-related Strategies and Initiatives in an Institutional Arena: 
The Case of the European Commission Green Paper on CSR
Abstract
Purpose: This paper provides a theoretically informed analysis of a struggle for 
power over the regulation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and Social and 
Environmental Accounting and Reporting (SEAR) within the European Union (EU). 
Design: The paper combines insights from institutional theory (Lawrence, 2008; 
Lawrence and Buchanan, 2017) with Vaara et al.’s (2006) and Vaara and Tenari’s 
(2008) discursive strategies approach in order to interrogate the dynamics of the 
institutional “arena” that emerged in 2001, following the European Commission’s 
publication of a Green Paper (GP) on CSR policy and reporting. Drawing on multiple 
sources of data (including newspaper coverage, semi-structured interviews and 
written submissions to the European Commission by companies and NGOs) we 
analyse the institutional political strategies employed by companies and NGOs – two 
of the key stakeholder groupings who sought to influence the dynamics and 
outcome of the European initiative.
Findings: Our results show that the 2001 GP was a “triggering event” (Hoffman, 
1999) that led to the formation of the institutional arena that centred on whether 
CSR policy and reporting should be voluntary or mandatory. Our findings highlight 
how two separate, but related forms of power (systemic and episodic power) were 
exercised much more effectively by companies compared to NGOs. More 
specifically, our analysis of the power initiatives and discursive strategies deployed in 
the arena provide a theoretically informed understanding of the ways in which 
companies acted in concert to reach their objective of maintaining CSR and SEAR as 
a voluntary activity.
Originality/value: The theoretical framework outlined in the paper highlights how 
the analysis of CSR and SEAR regulation can be enriched by examining the 
deployment of episodic and systemic power by relevant actors. 
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1. Introduction
The issues related to the social responsibilities of business and, in particular, of 
corporations have long attracted the attention of regulators, academics and 
practitioners. The term “corporate social responsibility” (CSR), although somewhat 
contested, has widely been used to refer to the social, environmental and ethical 
responsibilities that business and corporations hold as result of their economic, 
operational and commercial activities (Carroll, 1999; Garriga and Melè, 2004). Within 
the accounting and management literature, growing attention has been devoted to 
examining the several initiatives that have been proposed over time to “regulate” 
CSR activities - including the adoption of social and environmental accounting and 
reporting (SEAR)1.  
This paper provides a theoretically informed analysis of the power dynamics behind, 
and influence on, the regulation2 of SEAR as part of the development of a European 
Union (EU) CSR policy initiative between the period 2001 to 2006. This policy 
initiative began with the European Commission’s3 “appeal to companies’ sense of 
social responsibility [CSR] regarding best practices on… sustainable development” 
(European Commission, 2000, p.5). According to Fairbrass (2011), this “policy debate 
began in earnest with the publication of the [European] Commission’s Green Paper 
[GP] on CSR in 2001 [entitled ‘Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social 
Responsibility’]”. This GP launched a consultation process that attracted responses 
from over 250 organisations and individuals by the end of 2001.
Of particular relevance to our paper, the GP discussed, and invited further 
consideration of, a range of ideas including the adoption of SEAR by companies as 
well as the notion of third party verification. Extant corporate SEAR systems were 
criticised because “only a handful cover the full spectrum of corporate social 
responsibility issues” (European Commission, 2001, p.19). As a result, guidelines 
were recommended on standardised reporting and accounting metrics, reporting 
formats, and audit procedures.  In addition, the GP suggested that its new proposals 
would be integrated with existing international good practice; for example, the 
Social Accountability 8000 standard (Social Accountability International, 1997) and 
Global Reporting Initiative guidelines (GRI, 2000). Assurance and verification 
schemes for social and eco-labels were also suggested in order to improve their 
effectiveness and popularity.
Consultation responses were invited from a range of stakeholders and interested 
individuals affected by companies’ activities in order to, amongst other matters, 
“build on the voluntary nature of corporate social responsibility and identify ways in 
which it can contribute to achieving sustainable development and a more effective 
1 In this paper we widely use the term “social and environmental accounting and reporting” (SEAR) to 
generally refer to practices of accounting and reporting on CSR-related initiatives. 
2 There are different concepts of regulation, beyond the widespread view that it is synonymous with 
black letter legislation. For clarity, we adopt the perspectives on normativity and regulation discussed 
in Bebbington et al., (2012) and Buhr’s notion (2007) whereby “[v]oluntary and mandatory [disclosure 
regulations] are a spectrum, not an on-off switch” (p.63).
3 The European Commission is the executive arm, and politically independent, of the EU’s institutions.
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way of governance.” (ibid, p.21). The GP expanded on a particular aspect of the 
proposed governance element: more specifically, the GP considered how best to 
encourage companies “to publish a triple bottom line in their annual reports to 
shareholders that measures their performance against economic, environmental and 
social criteria” (ibid, p.22). In this respect, SEAR was regarded as a CSR instrument 
and was also mentioned as a potential action for promoting CSR (p.23).
We reflexively combine Lawrence and Buchanan’s (Lawrence and Buchanan, 2017; 
Lawrence, 2008) institutional politics framework alongside Vaara et al.’s (2006) and 
Vaara and Tenari’s (2008) discursive strategies approach in order to analyse the 
power-infused dynamics of the “regulatory arena” that emerged from the GP 
(Hancher and Moran, 1989, p.153). As explained by Hancher and Moran (1989), a 
“regulatory arena” depicts the “delineated space [whose] boundaries are defined by 
[the] issues” that are at the centre of public and political debates for regulation (p. 
153, emphasis added). A regulatory arena can be seen as a “contested space”, where 
different constituents and organisations employ power-related strategies as part of 
“ferocious struggles for [gaining] advantages” (ibid, p. 153). We argue that the 
“struggles” over whether or not CSR and SEAR should be a voluntary or mandatory 
activity, which emerged out of the GP, represent the centre and delineate the 
boundaries of the regulatory arena. From the perspective of the institutional 
(politics) theory4  adopted in this paper, this “regulatory arena” denoted a specific 
example of an “institutional arena”, which was characterised by contrasting 
“institutional politics strategies” and related “power-initiatives” (Lawrence and 
Buchanan, 2017).  
In this paper we examine how different constituents – companies and NGOs5 – 
deployed, or relied upon, different modes of power in order to influence the 
“institutional arena” that emerged from the European Commission’s GP. The 
theoretical framework allows us to consider the operation and significance of two 
separate “modes of power” in our analysis. More specifically: (i) systemic power, 
which is concerned with forms of power that operate through routines and taken for 
granted social and economic practices, and; (ii) episodic power, which is concerned 
with discrete, strategic acts of mobilization initiated by self-interested actors. The 
4 Institutional theory scholars claim that institutions represent “enduring patterns of social practices” 
(Lawrence, 2008, emphasis added). As explained by Jepperson (1991), institutions are “those 
practices for which departures from [these] patterns are counteracted in a regulated fashion by 
repetitively activated socially constructed controls, i.e. some sort of rewards and controls” (p. 145). 
Institutions are associated with regulating and enforcing mechanisms that ensure their very 
existence, resilience and applications (Phillips et al., 2004). From this perspective, it could be 
observed that institutions innately exert some form of “power-based control” on individuals and 
organisations. In particular, as explained by Lawrence (2008) and Scott (1995) it is the power in the 
form of repetitively activated control mechanisms that distinguish institutions from other social 
constructions. 
5 We define NGOs in line with LeRoux and Feeney (2015) as non profit organisations that serve a 
public mission, whilst being separate from government.
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theoretical framework we propose and the separate modes of power that pertain to 
it, will be further delineated in section 3 below. 
 
Our analysis highlights how systemic and episodic power-initiatives were 
strategically mobilised more effectively by companies compared to NGOs. More 
specifically, our analysis provides a theoretically informed understanding of the ways 
in which companies acted in concert with each other in order to reach their 
objective of maintaining CSR and SEAR as voluntary activities. For example, 
companies’ responses to the GP consultation appeared to ‘sing from the same song 
sheet’ in terms of the phrases used and the arguments that were deployed. In 
addition, companies appeared to have worked more successfully in mobilising power 
strategies ‘behind the scenes’ to bend the relevant European institutions to their 
(collective) view. For example, the EU Multi-Stakeholder Forum (EMS), which 
emerged from the GP consultation, was constituted such that companies and their 
representative bodies retained 50% of the seats and therefore could not be out-
voted by other stakeholder groups. This example illustrates the unequal distribution 
of stakeholder power in the process leading to the establishment of the EMS as well 
as in the operation of the Forum. Company power was strengthened by the fact that 
NGOs appeared unable to agree amongst themselves on the approach that they 
should all adopt; thus, their efforts to challenge the proposals in the initial GP 
document (especially around the voluntary nature of SEAR) were diffuse and 
consequently [initially]6 unsuccessful. We argue that the NGOs were unable to 
marshal either systemic or episodic power in order to effect change in the European 
Commission’s CSR and SEAR proposals, nor to counter the companies’ desired view 
that CSR be seen as a voluntary activity where reporting and assurance would be 
decided upon by the companies themselves.
In addition to the findings outlined above, our paper also provides a theoretical 
contribution by adding empirical “flesh” (Laughlin, 1995) for understanding the 
complex and shifting dynamics between the organisations that are at the heart of 
any economic regulation attempt and related regulatory activities (Hancher and 
Moran, 1989; Scott, 2004). 
The remainder of our paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we briefly 
review the extant literature, which has previously focused on the issues related to 
6 Though our analysis focuses on the period 2001-2006, we note that the EU’s 2014 Accounting 
Directive requires all entities employing over 500 people to disclose social and environmental 
information in the management section of their annual reports (European Parliament and Council, 
2014). We argue that our investigation of responses to the 2001 GP by two different groupings within 
the GP arena – business and NGOs – offers insights about the context from which this 2014 reporting 
regulation ultimately emerged. Monciardini (2017, p. 3) “identifies three professional élites - activist-
lawyers; financial analysts; and international accountants - as the “architects” of the current debate 
on CSR policies, in the EU context”.
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CSR and SEAR within the EU, so as to highlight some of the gaps that this paper seeks 
to address. In the third section, we discuss our theoretical framework, which was 
used to frame the analysis of our empirical findings. Following that, we describe our 
research methods and then present our empirical analysis. Finally, we provide some 
concluding remarks and discuss some of the key issues that emerge from our 
empirical analysis, including theoretical reflection.
2. CSR policy and SEAR in the EU 
CSR policy and SEAR is a fragmented field, partly because CSR is widely seen as a 
nebulous concept (see for example, Monciardini, 2016; Kinderman, 2013). However, 
in seeking to understand what has affected CSR policy and SEAR at the EU level and 
the decision to issue a GP on this topic in 2001, the literature offers several insights: 
 the key role played by the different Commissioners (e.g. Delors from 1985 to 
1995, Prodi from 1999 to 2004 and Barroso from 2004 to 2014) before, 
during and after the GP’s launch (Monciardini, 2016; Steurer et al., 2012; de 
Schutter, 2008; Steurer, 2010); 
 the influence of the different Directorates General in the European 
Commission with responsibility for the policy (Johansen, 2016); 
 the effect of different perspectives among the EU’s nation states7 and their 
political actors (Knudsen et al., 2013). For example, Fairbrass (2011) observed 
that UK and German government views were more evident than the opinions 
of the French government after the 2001 GP. However, Bickerton (2016) 
noted “…Delors capitalized on a convergence of views between West 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom” in his single market vision, of 
which CSR policy and SEAR development was a part. 
Other researchers have emphasized the importance of actors such as business 
groups and civic society (e.g. NGOs) and our analysis focuses, in particular, on these 
stakeholders. Fairbrass (2011) concluded that EU CSR policy following the 2001 GP 
was dominated by business views, with the European Parliament and civic advocacy 
groups side-lined (2011, p.966). According to Coen (1996, 1997, 1998; in Woll, 2006) 
individual corporations were important “political actors” (p.459), while Kinderman 
(2013) noted the significance of business groups and German employers in shaping 
EU CSR policy (p.701). However, anticipating the systemic power element of our 
analysis, Dür et al. (2015) concluded that business groups were only successful in 
influencing EU policy if agreement on the policy proposal was reached among 
“restricted elite circles” (see also Wisniewski and Moro, 2014; Cahan et al., 2016; 
Archel et al., 2011).
A sizeable amount of the literature in this area focuses on the effectiveness of 
different policy instruments - and EU policy lobbying - in achieving specific 
outcomes. According to Woll (2006), for instance, a key element of the EU lobbying 
7 The importance of nation states is echoed by Bickerton (2016): “…the Commission’s powers to 
propose laws are restricted to those policy areas chosen by member states” (p.20) and “[w]ithout the 
political will of member states, proposals go nowhere, even those produced by some of the most 
powerful men [sic] in Europe.” (p.29). However, Woll (2006) concludes that “national political 
traditions continue to matter in the context of EU policy-making” (p.459). 
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literature8 has centred on “the corporatism-pluralism debate” (p.458), such that 
early studies in European lobbying focussed on “European federations” or “national 
interest groups”, which emerged and coalesced into different “patterns of interest 
group intermediation that developed around the European policy-making process”. 
Studies in this area note that such coalescing can be remarkably effective. 
In particular, existing literature shows that business groups’ lobbying was successful 
in influencing EU policy and regulation on CSR and SEAR. For instance, in its 
conclusions about the process initiated by the 2001 GP, the European Commission 
(2006) stated: “acknowledging that enterprises are the primary actors in CSR, the 
Commission has decided that it can best achieve its objectives by working more 
closely with European business” (p.1). The subsequent establishment of the 
European Alliance on CSR, which only included business members clearly shows the 
success of one set of respondents – business groups – in having their voices heard 
and their views acted upon in relation to the 2001 GP9. 
However, most of the existing literature about CSR policy and SEAR at the EU level 
suffers from a number of problems. It tends to view the process whereby the EU’s 
policy on CSR and SEAR evolved as a “black box”. Even those that do attempt to look 
inside this black box often fail to take account of the different levels of power 
exercised by the various stakeholders involved. The present paper attempts to 
overcome these limitations by examining, in particular, the development of EU 
regulation on SEAR, as part of their CSR policy from the late 1990s to 2006. We use a 
theoretical framework drawn from institutional politics theory, which focuses on the 
main business groups and NGO actors and their deployment of systemic and 
episodic power in the arena of the European Commission’s CSR GP. 
3. The Institutional Politics of Institutional Arenas: the interplay between systemic 
and episodic forms of power 
In this paper, insights from institutional theory are adopted to investigate the so-
called “institutional politics” (Lawrence and Buchanan, 2017; Lawrence, 2008) of the 
arena, which emerged from the GP initiative of the European Commission in 2001 to 
“regulate” CSR and SEAR initiatives (hereafter the GP-arena). In particular, drawing 
on Lawrence and Buchanan (2017) as well as Vaara and Tienari (2008), a theoretical 
framework is proposed to analyse ‘what strategies’ were adopted by NGOs and 
companies to affect the arena’s dynamics and ‘how’ these strategies were 
implemented with regard to the definition, problematisation and suggestions about 
whether any SEAR framework should be voluntary or mandatory. The remainder of 
this section is organized in two subsections, which discuss respectively the concept 
8 As evidence from the USA confirms that the share value of firms that lobby ‘significantly 
outperforms’ those that do not” (p.11), it is perhaps not surprising that “business spends substantially 
more on lobbying than any other group in society” (p.11).
9 At the same time, the employer organisation BusinessEurope /UNICE wrote to its members that “A 
few passages [in the European Commission (2006) Communication on CSR] must be interpreted as 
verbal concessions to other stakeholders, which will however have no real impact.” (Ungericht and 
Hirt, 2010, p.14).
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of institutional politics (and related power-infused strategies) associated with an 
institutional arena and the analytical framework adopted in this paper.
Insert Table 1 here
3.1 The institutional politics and related power-infused dynamics of institutional 
fields and/or arenas            
A relevant strand of research in organizational institutionalism (Greenwood et al., 
2008) has considered ‘how’ and ‘under what conditions’ institutional fields emerge, 
develop and evolve alongside existing or emerging institutions. As Scott (1995, p.56) 
explains, an institutional field represents “a community of [diverse] organisations 
that partakes of a common meaning system and whose participants interact more 
frequently with one another than with actors outside the field” (emphasis added). 
Such a community of participations may emerge and develop around different types 
of “centres”, which may include markets (Holm, 1995), industries (Garud et al., 
2002), regulation activities (Hancher and Moran, 1989) and contested issues 
(Hoffman, 1999). From this perspective, therefore, fields represent “centres of 
debates in which competing interests negotiate over interpretation and [outcomes]” 
(Hoffman, 1999, p.351). According to Hoffman (1999), the process whereby fields 
are formed is not “static” but dynamic as new “forms of debate emerge in the wake 
of triggering events that cause a reconfiguration of field membership and/or 
interaction patterns” (ibid, p.351). Thus, a field becomes a centre for channels of 
dialogue, discussion and controversies between the different actors that participate 
in the field’s life (Scott, 2001). In this sense, fields can be seen as “arenas of power 
relations” (Brint and Karable, 1991, emphasis added) where multiple constituents, 
with disparate purposes and (self-) interests, interact and compete over the 
formation of the field (Hoffman, 1999; Stryker, 2000; Smith, Haniffa and Fairbrass, 
2011). As suggested by Lawrence (2008), an institutional field should be described as 
an issue-centred arena, i.e. as the symbolic location of discussion, dialogue, 
interactions and actions that characterize the collective decisions with regard to a 
specific issue (e.g. corporate environmentalism). Within each arena, multiple actors 
employ different resources (e.g. money, social influence, lobbying) to shape the 
arena’s dynamics and pursue their goals. An arena, therefore, denotes a “complex 
and heterogeneous” domain (Greenwood et al., 2011) of power-infused interactions 
and relations between several individuals or collective actors (Georgakopolous and 
Thomson, 2008; Lawrence and Buchanan, 2017), who coalesce, confront and 
compete in order to affect the arena’s life (Hoffman, 1999) in pursuit of their goals. 
As we have already outlined above, the space, which emerges out of the regulation 
activities (e.g. regulation about product stewardship), can be understood as an 
institutional arena that is characterized by power-infused dynamics10. 
10 In this paper, an institutional field is seen as a specific form of (physical and/or symbolic) domain of 
institutional life and related dynamics. In particular, a field is characterized by the existence of a 
Page 7 of 48 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal8
As Lawrence and Buchanan (2017) and Munir (2015) emphasize, the consideration of 
these power-infused dynamics is key for understanding the logics underpinning the 
formation, evolution and change of (institutions and) institutional arenas. In 
particular, the multidimensional relationships between (power and) power-related 
dynamics and institutional change describe the so-called institutional politics11 
(Lawrence and Buchanan, 2017; Lawrence, 2008; Stryker, 2000) of a specific 
institutional arena.
Institutional politics can be defined as “the strategic mobilization and counter-
mobilization” (Stryker, 2000, p.190) of “material and symbolic resources” through 
which “individual, group and organisational actors” effect an arena by “influenc[ing] 
the authoritative decision-making in accord[ance] with their perceived interests and 
values” (ibid, pp.179-180). In particular, Lawrence and Buchanan (2017) maintain 
that institutional politics involves two primary power-based dynamics: i) institutional 
control; and ii) institutional agency12. Each of these dynamics (see below for 
definitions) describes the role that power and power-based strategies “play in 
shaping the relationship between institutions, actors” and organisations within an 
institutional arena (ibid, p.480).
Institutional control refers to the impact that institutions exert on the beliefs and 
behaviours of individual and/or organisational actors (Lawrence and Buchanan, 
2017). Institutional control is concerned with the way in which institutions organize, 
shape and influence particular forms of thought and actions in specific institutional 
domains (Lawrence, 2008; Scott, 2001). As Lawrence and Buchanan (2017) explain, 
community of organizations which frequently and repeatedly interact about, and compete over, a 
debated issue. From this perspective, therefore, an institutional field can be seen as a “power-based 
arena” where the different constituents battle in and for (Scott, 2008).
11 In more recent years, in the organizational institutionalism literature, more attention has been 
devoted to the analysis of change, interests and conflicts in the emergence of institutions and 
institutional arenas. As emphasized by Lawrence and Buchanan (2017), this research (e.g. institutional 
work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence at al., 2009)), has emphasized the role of power and 
power-related dynamics in the context of institutional change. Research on institutional politics 
represents an attempt to bring agency and power dynamics into the analysis of institutions and 
institutional life.
12 The difference between institutional control and institutional agency recalls the broad parameters 
of the structure and agency debate that has characterized much of the research in social and 
organisational studies. Garud, Hardy and Maguire (2007, p.960-961) note that “privileging structure 
over agency leads to causally deterministic models” whereby some features of the social world 
structure or determine other aspects. According to Garud, Hardy and Maguire (2007, p.960-961), “in 
the extreme” such a view renders humans as being void of agency who “are assumed to be 
automaton-like processors”. On the other hand, on the agency side of the debate, individuals are 
considered to possess agency and free choice with the capacity to influence their environment. At the 
extreme, such views have a tendency to “promote heroic models of actors and have been criticized 
for being ahistorical, decontextualized and universalistic” (ibid, p.960-961). Within the context of this 
debate, the framework proposed by Lawrence and Buchanan (2017) has the potential to offer insights 
into the processual dynamics linking structure and agency, which are implicated in the construction 
and formation of organisational and individual actions. In this sense, the Lawrence and Buchanan 
(2017) framework emphasis a somewhat more dialectical and less-deterministic relationship between 
structure and agency. 
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institutional control operates independently of any particular actor or the interests 
of these actors. For instance, institutional control may derive from the intervention 
of a specific law or regulation within an industry, market or region (e.g. the 
regulation of product labelling) which affects the practices of the individuals or 
organisations in that industry, market or region. On the other hand, institutional 
agency13 describes the self-interested work of individual or collective actors to 
create, transform and disrupt institutions (Lawrence and Buchanan, 2017; Lawrence, 
2008). For example, institutional agency can refer to the initiatives that are 
undertaken by an individual or organized group of actors within a specific arena to 
modify and shape the institutions and institutional life of that arena (see for example 
Holm, 1995). 
In their theoretical framework, Lawrence and Buchanan (2017) link institutional 
control and institutional agency with two different “modes of power”14 (i.e. different 
ways in which power can be exerted/exercised), which they call “systemic power” 
and “episodic power” respectively (see Table 2). On the one hand, systemic power 
(associated with institutional control) represents a form of power that operates 
“through routine[s] [and] ongoing practices to advantage particular groups without 
those groups necessarily establishing or maintaining those practices” (Lawrence and 
Buchanan, 2017, p.480). For instance, this variety of systemic power may include tax 
and insurance regimes as well as accreditation systems but also involves established 
and taken for granted social and economic practices. All of these provide rules and 
norms that divide (Russell and Thomson, 2009) what are considered to be feasible, 
acceptable and normal forms of thought and behaviour from those which are not 
(though see Archel et al., 2011). Lawrence and Buchanan (2017) argue that systemic 
power can be exerted through two main modes (or forms): domination and 
discipline. Domination indicates a form of power that supports institutional control 
through systems, procedures and practices that “restrict” and “delimit” the range of 
options available to actors. For instance, forms of domination include: i) physical and 
social systems such as the layout of office and/or the format of technologies used; ii) 
established economic and business practices that, through their underlying 
assumptions and discourses (e.g. economic growth; the inevitability of profit-
maximisation as a business objective), restrict the options for what is seen as normal 
and acceptable behaviour and thought. Discipline is a mode of power that involves 
an ongoing and systematic engagement with the target of the power (e.g. an 
individual) and relies on the agency of that individual to affect her/his behaviour 
(Clegg, 1989).
On the other hand, episodic power (associated with institutional agency) refers to 
“relatively discrete, strategic acts of mobilization initiated by self-interested actors” 
(Lawrence and Buchanan, 2017, p.480) to attend to specific objectives. From this 
perspective, power is linked to the ability of actors to mobilize resources in order to 
13 As emphasized by Scott (2008), agency describes the “actor ’s ability to have some effect on the 
social world- altering the rules, the relational ties, or distribution of resources” (p.77).  
14 Drawing on the work of Clegg (1989), Lawrence and Buchanan (2017, p.480) see power “as a 
property of relationships such that the beliefs or behaviours of an actor are affected by another actor 
or system”. In this sense, power is seen as a “relational phenomenon rather than a commodity”, that 
can be held or stored.     
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modify and direct others’ behaviours. According to Lawrence and Buchanan (2017) 
and Lawrence (2008), episodic forms of power include force and influence. Force, 
which can be understood in a physical or bureaucratic way, describes a mode of 
power that works by directly and evidently overcoming another actor’s intention or 
behaviour15. The second mode of episodic power is influence. Lawrence and 
Buchanan (2017) argue that influence denotes the ability of an individual, or 
collective of actors, to persuade and induce another actor to do something that 
she/he would not otherwise do. This form of power can be exerted through a variety 
of initiatives and strategies, which may include, for example, corporate sponsorship, 
moral and rational persuasion, lobbying for regulatory change, discursive and 
legitimation strategies. An analysis of the different ways in which these strategies 
and initiatives allow multiple and self-interested actors to exert influence is essential 
to the understanding of “how” and “why” specific institutional arenas (e.g. 
regulatory arenas) are shaped and change over time (Holm, 1995; Stryker, 2000). 
3.2 An analytical framework to investigate the institutional politics of the GP-arena
Drawing on Lawrence and Buchanan (2017), an analytical framework is employed in 
this paper to explore in detail the competing power-infused strategies and initiatives 
that were adopted by business groups and NGOs to affect and shape the GP-arena’s 
dynamics, including the definition, problematisation and suggested solutions for 
SEAR in the EU. The proposed framework (see Table 1 and Table 2), which has been 
enriched with insights from Vaara et al.,’s (2006) and Vaara and Tienari (2008)’s 
discursive strategies, helps to illuminate the diverse modes through which 
institutional agency, in the form of episodic power, took place. 
In particular, we will consider two forms of influence: i) the discursive strategies 
adopted16; and ii) other influencing actions, such as the lobbying initiatives which 
took place, moral suasion and relational persuasion. We contend that the intra-
arena dynamics, including the initiatives (and counter- initiatives) of institutional 
agency of both constituents in our study (i.e. business groups and NGOs), were 
strongly affected by the dominant economic discourses (and practices) of the wider 
institutional context. In particular, the accepted and taken for granted discourses 
and practices of the existing institutional context represented forms of domination, 
i.e. forms of institutional control that restricted and delimited the actions in the GP-
arena (see Table 2 for details). 
15 In the context of organizations, bureaucratic force is the most common form of force exerted. For 
instance, bureaucratic forms of force may include the procedures and systems adopted by a 
corporation to fire employees or by universities to expel poorly performing students. 
16 While discursive strategies are highlighted as being a manifestation of episodic power, we note that 
the Lawrence and Buchanan (2017) framework has the potential to offer insights into the processual 
dynamics between discourses and social structures. In this sense, and in keeping with the dialectical 
relationship between structure and agency outlined in note 12, we maintain that discourse itself also 
shares something of this dialectic relationship. As Jorgensen and Phillips (2002, p.65) note: "discourse 
is an important form of social practice which both reproduces and changes knowledge, identities and 
social relations, including power relations, and at the same time, is also shaped by other social 
practices and structures”.
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Insert Table 2 here
As noted above, Lawrence and Buchanan (2017) propose that influence can be 
exerted through a range of approaches, including discursive strategies. With regard 
to discursive strategies we investigate how and why some strategies were more 
powerful than others and seemed to influence and shape the dynamics of the GP-
arena. As Phillips et al., (2004) observe, understanding the institutional effects of 
discourses is essential for investigating how the dynamics of an institutional arena 
take place and how actions are affected (see also Archel et al., 2011; Bozanic et al., 
2012). Our analysis of discursive strategies is informed by Vaara and Tienari (2008) 
and Vaara et al. (2006), who develop a typology of discursive strategies that can be 
employed in order to establish legitimacy within an institutional arena and therefore 
influence the dynamics of this arena (see Holm, 1995). More specifically, they 
identify five “discursive legitimation strategies”: (i) Rationalization; (ii) Moral 
Evaluation; (iii) Authorization; (iv) Normalization (as a separate category of 
authorization); and (v) Mythopoesis (or narrativisation). 
4. Research Methods
Our analysis of the dynamics of the GP arena is undertaken in two phases (see 
section 5 for more detail), reflecting the “systemic power” and “episodic power” 
components of the analytical framework outlined above. Table 3 provides an 
overview of the data sources and methods associated with each phase of the 
analysis. A multi-method approach was adopted to capture the various conditions, 
factors, processes and main actors of the GP arena. In other words, the data 
collected through this multi-method approach helped to develop a richer and deeper 
understanding of the empirical domain of our investigation. In particular, drawing on 
the theoretical insights discussed above, we present a theoretically-informed 
analysis to interpret (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006) the socio-institutional context 
within which the GP arena evolved and the power-based initiatives that were 
adopted by business groups and NGOs to influence and shape the contours of the 
arena. In the following, we provide more detail about the sources of our data and 
the methods through which these were analysed.
Insert Table 3 here
For phase 1 of the analysis, two sources of data were utilized: newspaper coverage 
of the GP and semi-structured interviews. Several studies have highlighted the 
importance of considering newspaper coverage when analysing struggles within an 
institutional arena. For example, Ferns and Amaeshi (2017, p.8) argue that, 
“newspaper articles are often considered useful for analyzing discursive struggles 
because of the media’s dual role as both mirroring public debate while actively 
shaping the character of society by giving meaning to its institutions”. Similarly, 
Joutsenvirta and Vaara (2015, p.745) point out that newspapers help “defin[e]… the 
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public agenda [and] synthesize various aspects of the discursive and ideological 
struggles” (see also Beelitz and Merkl-Davies, 2011). Lupu and Sandu (2017, p. 534) 
extend this viewpoint by noting “how legitimacy relies on the multiple processes … 
linking corporate narratives and media texts”.
For our analysis, a search was undertaken of the Nexis database17 for newspaper 
articles related to the GP, SEAR or CSR at the EU-level during the period from July 
2001 until March 2006. This period marked the first phase of a “regulatory cycle” 
related to CSR within the EU (Monciardini, 2016, p.80)18. All articles containing 
references to the GP or CSR at the EU-level were downloaded and read by two 
members of the research team. This analysis noted the topic of the piece, the format 
of the publication (e.g. letter, article, feature) and any affiliation of the author. 
In addition to the newspaper analysis, Phase 1 of our investigation was also 
informed by semi-structured interviews that were conducted, in the first half of 
2005, with four individuals who were knowledgeable about, and involved in, the GP. 
Although small in number, these interviewees included one MEP and two senior civil 
servants working in Brussels for the Commission in Directorates involved with the GP 
proposal (see Table 3). The final interviewee was the head of an NGO that was 
involved in the European Commission’s CSR proposal. The interviews sought to 
ascertain views about the history behind the publication of the GP. Interviewees 
were also asked about the extent, and type, of any lobbying associated with the 
European Commission’s GP. Each interview was recorded, lasted for about one and 
half hours, on average, and all except one were attended by two researchers. 
Insights from the interviews were also used to inform the analysis of the second 
phase. 
Phase 2 of our study involved an interpretive analysis of the discursive strategies 
employed in the submissions on the GP made by business groups and NGOs; these 
submissions were invited when the GP was first issued, collated by the European 
Commission and published on their website in 2001 (see Table 4). As outlined above, 
our analysis of discursive strategies is informed by Vaara and Tienari’s (2008) and 
Vaara et al.’s (2006) typology of legitimation strategies. In addition, insights from the 
interviews were also used to enrich our analysis of the episodic power initiatives 
which were mobilised by NGOs and business groups to influence the arena’s 
dynamics. 
17 Nexis provides news and business information from a range of sources, including UK national and 
regional newspapers, international newspapers and newswires, and foreign language news sources. 
See: https://www.nexis.com
18 In his analysis of the development of CSR within the EU, Kinderman (2013, p.701) claims that “the 
EU’s role in EU CSR has changed from social-liberal standardsetter to neo-liberal cheerleader and 
back”. Our analysis follows the first part of this transition, beginning with the issue of the GP in July 
2001 (the “social-liberal standardsetter” stage) to the European Commission (2006) Communication 
that promoted a voluntary approach to CSR (“neo-liberal cheerleader” stage). A second phase to the 
“regulatory cycle began only in 2008, immediately after the burst of the financial crisis” (Monciardini, 
2016, p.80), which marks a return towards a social-liberal approach to CSR (Kinderman, 2013, p.701).
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Insert Table 4 here
5. Empirical Analysis: understanding the interplay between systemic and episodic 
power in the GP-arena 
In this section, we present our analysis. Firstly, we examine the historical and 
institutional context, which affected the genesis of the GP in 2001, and established 
the systemic power within the GP-arena. Secondly, we provide an analysis of the 
episodic power-infused initiatives that NGOs and business groups espoused to 
compete for domination within the contours of the GP arena over the period up to 
2006. 
5.1. The background to the formation in 2001 of the GP-Arena: understanding the 
role of systemic power
The genesis of the GP can be traced back to the Jacques Delors presidency of the 
European Commission in the 1990s and, in particular, his initiative to establish a 
European Declaration of Businesses against Social Exclusion (Kinderman, 2013, 
p.705; Monciardini, 2016; Muhle, 2011). Concerned with rising unemployment, 
poverty and social exclusion, Delors developed the ‘Declaration’ in 1995 as a vehicle 
to enlist business support to help address some of these wider social issues; 1996 
saw the establishment of the European Business Network for Social Cohesion 
(EBNSC) (renamed ‘CSR Europe’ in 2000)19. Similar considerations were reported by 
Interviewee B, a civil servant, who emphasizes that at that period, 
“there was some unease with the closing of … factor[ies], which …[did not 
happen] in a socially responsible way. There was a major outcry about this”.
According to Interviewee A, a MEP during this period:
“You can really draw [the GP] into the Delors initiative, which certain 
businesses responded to very positively. They’d go and establish the agenda”.
Another factor associated with the growing awareness and demand for CSR policy 
and SEAR within Europe, as highlighted in media reports at the time, relates to the 
rise in mergers and acquisitions at the end of the 20th Century. This increase in 
merger and acquisitions activity brought “restructuring” and “large-scale 
redundancies” across (especially mainland20) Europe (Spinant, 2001; see also, 
Staunton, 2001, p.16). At a time when “employers were increasingly fractious 
19 One of the reasons attributed to this change was that “the legitimacy of the EBNSC to represent the 
voice of business” was being questioned by business groups, who “feared that the EBNSC was 
harbouring a hidden regulatory agenda” (Kinderman, 2013, p.707). CSR Europe placed less emphasis 
on social exclusion, stressed the importance of ‘entrepreneurship’ and did not maintain relationships 
with trade unions or labour organisations (unlike its predecessor, the EBNSC). 
20 While there had been a history of merger and acquisitions “waves” in the UK throughout the 19th 
century, this was a relatively recent phenomenon in mainland Europe. For example, between 1992 
and 2000, these transactions grew by 250% for firms within the EU (Sudarsanam, 2003). 
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towards the rituals of the corporatist collective bargain”, this inevitably led to 
growing concerns for employee welfare and demands for increased employee 
participation in corporate decision making (Monciardini, 2016, p.79).
Towards the end of the 20th century, another institution of the EU, the European 
Parliament, was “very much in touch with NGOs and campaigners about issues of 
corporate responsibility” (Interviewee A), which led to a parliamentary resolution in 
1999 calling for a binding European Code of Conduct to govern companies’ labour, 
environmental and human rights practices. The contents of the European Parliament 
resolution provide an early indication of the stark differences in approach to CSR 
policy and SEAR that were to emerge between the European Parliament and 
European Commission. More specifically, the European Parliament resolution took a 
more regulatory orientation – proposing, among other things, a ‘monitoring 
platform’ which would handle complaints about companies, and a social labelling 
scheme (Lozano and Prandi, 2005, p.192). 
Further impetus for CSR within the EU context emerged through the Lisbon 
Strategy21, a developmental plan that was launched in March 2000 by EU heads of 
state and governments as well as the European Council (De Schutter, 2008; 
Kinderman, 2013; Muhle, 2011). According to Interviewee B, “in the Lisbon 
[Strategy] conclusions there was a paragraph about Corporate Social Responsibility 
which did put CSR on the EU political agenda”. Similarly, Interviewee A reflected that 
the Lisbon Strategy was “a very important point where [CSR] moves into the 
European mainstream”.  
However, the Lisbon Strategy not only marks the point where CSR enters the 
mainstream, but also the emergence of: (i) contested understandings of CSR within 
the EU22; and (ii) a neo-liberal orientation to CSR within the EU. According to 
Interviewee D, a representative of a NGO, it was evident that the “European 
Commission and Council of Ministers [gave] much stronger endorsement to the sort 
of neo-liberal [and] trade liberalisation type agenda” than to any other context for 
CSR. Both of these issues become strikingly visible following the release of the GP in 
2001, and are discussed further below. 
Contemporaneously, other wider social forces were at play, which undoubtedly 
contributed to a sense of urgency around CSR related issues within the EU’s 
institutions. For example, in 2001, the Observer reported that: 
“The issue of corporate power has risen high up the international agenda, 
aided by campaign groups and authors such as George Monbiot, Naomi Klein 
and Noreena Hertz… The transformation can be traced back to Shell's calamity 
in 1995 with the Brent Spar oil platform and the Ogoniland imbroglio” (Crowe, 
2001, p.9).
21 https://portal.cor.europa.eu/europe2020/Profiles/Pages/TheLisbonStrategyinshort.aspx 
22 For example, Kinderman (2013, p.707) notes that “a statement in the Lisbon Agenda, drafted by 
CSR Europe, on the role of CSR in achieving the Lisbon goals triggered [a] clash with BusinessEurope”
Page 14 of 48Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal15
The article also highlighted the so-called “Battle of Seattle” in 1999 as a relevant 
factor in the development of CSR, when a coalition of NGOs and anti-globalization 
“demonstrators… brought the proceedings of the World Trade Organisation to a 
halt” (Crowe, 2001, p.9). Similarly, Interviewee B reflected that developments 
around the GP emerged “just after the Seattle events, with the backlash against 
globalisation. It was in the air that business as usual in the ‘90s was facing opposition 
in society”. From the perspective of institutional theory, these events (e.g. Shell’s 
calamity, activist campaigns, factory closures, etc.) represented “trigger” (Hoffman, 
1999) factors that challenged institutional inertia and promoted change in the 
existing way of understanding CSR-related issues. In other words, these events, in 
conjunction with the existing favourable political and economic conditions (e.g. 
Delors’ initiative), helped to give ‘visibility’ to, and to increase ‘awareness’ of, the 
problematic issues related to business conduct and created the scope for initiatives 
such as CSR and associated SEAR.      
From the analysis of our empirical data, it appears that, by the end of the 1990s and 
before the publication of the GP in 2001, two main CSR-related discourses seemed 
to emerge. These discourses were centred on two issues: i) the urgency of a CSR-
agenda given that the European Parliament, the European Council and the European 
Commission were all exercised by various aspects of its dimensions; and ii) the need 
for business support. In particular, business and corporations were considered key 
actors for setting and, in the words of Interviewee A, “establish[ing] the agenda”. 
Our analysis indicates that these discourses gradually and increasingly became the 
“normal” and “acceptable” (Lawrence and Buchanan, 2017; Lawrence, 2008) ways of 
understanding and dealing with the CSR issues. From the theoretical perspective 
adopted in this paper, these discourses, thus, acted as a form of systemic power, 
which subsequently “delimited” and “restricted” the range of options for thinking 
and acting towards CSR and related SEAR practices.            
2001: the emergence of the GP-arena
The GP was issued by the Commission in July 2001, with December 2001 set as the 
deadline for consultation responses from any interested parties. During the process 
of its development, media reports noted that the GP was “a product of three 
European Commission Directorates-General” – the Social Affairs Commissioner, 
Anna Diamantopoulou; the Industry Commissioner, Erkki Liikanen; and the 
Environment Commissioner, Margot Wallstrom (Europolitics, 2001, p.4, 
Europolitique – initially entitled European Report in English). While three 
Directorates-General (DG) were involved in the development of the GP, in these 
early stages of CSR within the EU, the Social Affairs DG served as the “home-base” 
(Fairbrass, 2011 p.959) and “chef de file” (Europolitics, 2001, p.4). In terms of our 
analysis, the publication of the GP and the consultation process that followed, 
represented the significant “triggering event” (Hoffman, 1999) that inaugurated the 
formation of the “institutional arena” (Brint and Karable, 1991); this centred on 
whether any CSR policy and reporting framework - including SEAR - should be 
voluntary or mandatory. In this sense, the publication of the GP was the first formal 
act that started a “centre of [regulatory] debate” (Lawrence, 2008; Hoffman, 1999) 
between different interested groups, such as NGOs, business groups and other 
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actors. In addition, by providing a formal definition of CSR, the GP delimited the 
contours of the issue at the centre of debate and laid out the rules of engagement in 
the arena. From this perspective, therefore, the concept of CSR in the GP 
represented a form of “dividing construct” (Russell and Thomson, 2009), which 
“delimits” and “restricts” (Lawrence and Buchanan, 2017; Lawrence, 2008) the 
possible ways of understanding and debating the issue.      
The GP consultation document characterised the common understanding of CSR as 
follows: “a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns 
in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a 
voluntary basis” (Section II, emphasis added). The voluntary basis of CSR was also 
emphasised in media coverage at the time. For example, reporting on the 
publication of the GP, the Financial Times referred to CSR in general as a “voluntary 
movement” adding somewhat ominously that, “any attempt at heavy-handed 
intervention from the Commission would almost certainly be the kiss of death for 
CSR among European companies” (Cowe, 2001, p.16, emphasis added). The 
voluntary approach to CSR was presented as the normal way of understanding and 
defining CSR. As emphasized by Interviewee B: 
“… the integration of social and environmental [issues] on a voluntary basis, was 
the credo all the time”. 
Not only did the GP frame CSR as voluntary, but two of the European Commissioners 
involved with its inception were keen to highlight the business benefits of CSR at its 
launch. As Staunton (2001, p.16) reports:
“Employment and Enterprise Commissioners, Ms Anna Diamantopoulou and Mr 
Erkki Liikanen, said that an ethical approach was good for business… “More and 
more firms are realising the link between profitability and best ethical and 
environmental practice. Conscientious firms not only attract and retain the best 
workers, they can also get ahead in the technology game, vital for that all-
important competitive edge” they said.”
The GP “elicited responses from about 260 organizations and individuals during 
2001… The overwhelming majority [coming] from organized interests” (Fairbrass 
2011, p.959). According to Fairbrass’s (2011, p.960) analysis, companies were by far 
the largest group present in the submissions – representing 42% of overall 
submissions.  More specifically, as Interviewee B noted, the majority of responses 
were submitted by “British companies. They [were] the largest quantity or group”. He 
added that:
 “I suspect that there may have been a role given to British business to make their 
voices heard. It may have been a strategy to send many responses because they 
tend to say more or less the same [thing]”.  
The analysis of our empirical findings shows that the emergence of the GP-arena, as 
a result of the publication of the GP in 2001, was characterized and influenced by 
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two emerging discourses related to CSR: i) the voluntary approach to CSR; ii) the 
business benefits of CSR. These two discourses appeared to be coherent and 
connected (Phillips et al., 2004); while the involvement of business groups was seen 
as necessary for the success of any CSR policy and SEAR framework, this involvement 
needed to be based on some benefits to business participants. Any CSR policy and 
SEAR framework, therefore, should be voluntary because, as emphasized by 
Interviewee D, “any regulation [would have been seen as] a burden”. In other words, 
the voluntary approach discourse was a sine qua non for the successful involvement 
of the business actors. As observed by Interviewee C, 
“once we decided that CSR is voluntary we need businesses to be on board. The 
voluntary nature is necessary so that businesses think that it is theirs”.                    
As we will see later, these two connected discourses, which emerged in the early 
phase of the GP-arena, were relevant to understand the initiatives that were 
subsequently (feasible to be) undertaken by NGOs and business groups to influence 
and shape the dynamics of the arena. 
 
2002-2006: the evolution of the GP-arena 
One of the key developments immediately after the GP consultation occurred 
when the Commission issued its Communication concerning CSR in July 2002, 
entitled Communication on Corporate Social Responsibility: a business contribution 
to Sustainable Development (European Commission, 2002). It provided a very brief 
synopsis of the responses to the GP and, in particular, noted that companies 
“stressed the voluntary nature of CSR” while civil society organisations emphasised 
the inadequacy of voluntary initiatives.  
In the lead-up to the publication of this Communication, a schism between the 
European Parliament’s and European Commission’s approaches to CSR policy and 
SEAR became more pronounced. For example, Europolitics (2002, April 24th, 
Section 2678) reported that:
“MEPs have expressed their disappointment at the European Commission's 
June 2001 Green Paper on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), complaining 
that it simply lists a large number of current initiatives whilst suggesting a 
largely voluntary, rather than regulatory, approach to the issue. The non-
legislative report, drafted by British Socialist Richard Howitt (PSE, UK), was 
adopted by the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs in the 
Parliament on April 23… Mr Howitt is not happy with [the] definition, arguing 
in his report that it undermines the very idea of global governance and 
indicates that the only idea of CSR is a voluntary one.”
Reporting on a European Parliament vote on “new rules requiring annual social and 
environmental reports alongside financial accounts” (emphasis in original) in May 
2002, a Financial Times article highlighted the different position taken by the 
‘Employment and Enterprise’ commissioner Anna Diamantopoulou and the 
European Commission. The article states that Diamantopoulou’s “officials say 
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binding legislation is not yet on the cards” adding that "CSR is a voluntary exercise 
for business and it's becoming more common across Europe" (Maitland and Mann, 
2002, p.14).
There was a notable outcry within certain sections of the British press when the 
European Parliament voted to back proposals mandating annual social and 
environmental reports. For example, the Daily Mail reported that “The 
Confederation of British Industry said it would be working with counterparts across 
Europe to persuade the Commission to reject the proposals” and that, according to 
Ruth Lea from the Institute of Directors, “this corporate governance agenda is a 
distraction dreamt up by people who do not know how business works” (Wilson, 
2002, p.23). Similarly, Accountancy Age (Zea, 2002, p.3) (a trade magazine for 
accounting and finance professionals in the UK), denounced the proposals as “a load 
of hot air”, reporting that the Institute of Directors and the UK's Department of 
Trade and Industry had both “heaped criticism on a proposal from the European 
Parliament to make [social and] environmental reporting compulsory”. 
Following publication of the Communication, the other key development during this 
period was the emergence of the European Multi-Stakeholder Forum (EMS)23 on 
CSR, which was established in October 2002 as a result of recommendations 
contained in the July 2002 Communication. From the analysis undertaken in this 
paper, the Communication issued in July 2002 and the constitution of the EMS in 
October 2002 represented relevant initiatives which “reinforced” (Contrafatto, 2014) 
the arena by providing “resources” and “channels” (Hoffman, 1999; Lawrence, 2008) 
for further interaction and confrontation between the arena’s actors, in particular 
NGOs and business groups. For example, Interviewee B stated that businesses 
refused to participate in the EMS “unless they had 50% of the seats” (see also 
Ungericht and Hirt, 2010, p.11). In addition, these “reinforcing initiatives” 
contributed to a re-shaping of the structure, participants and dynamics of the arena. 
As emphasized by Fairbrass (2011, p.959) “this second stage in the interactive 
process marked the first narrowing of the actors invited to participate in the 
deliberations”. While around 30 organizations participated, including a range of 
public, private and voluntary bodies, the negotiations were closed to members of 
the public.  
In addition, the CSR policy and SEAR process witnessed a further development that 
proved very significant for CSR within the EU; namely the political complexion of the 
Commission changed when the “centre left” EU President Romano Prodi was 
replaced as president by the “centre right” Manuel Barroso in November 2004. This 
political event marked a significant change event, which “challenged” the 
equilibrium (Holm, 1995) of the GP-arena and “triggered” (Hoffman, 1999) some 
institutional reconfiguration in the existing practices and discourses. As a result of 
23 While the Communication emphasized a voluntary approach to CSR, De Schutter (2008, p.208) 
argues that aspects of this document stressed the need for: (i) “convergence” towards commonly 
agreed criteria for CSR and SEAR, and; (ii) the identification and exploration of “areas where 
additional action is needed at [the] European level”.  According to De Schutter (p.209), “the 
Commission… expressed its hope that the [EMS]” would consider and address these two issues.
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this change in the complexion of the Commission, there was a shift in the political 
orientation, which, among other things, affected their vision and approach to the 
CSR policy and SEAR framework.    
As a result of this political reconfiguration, the existing discourses about a ‘voluntary 
approach to CSR’ and ‘the business case for CSR’ seemed to receive even wider 
support. From the analysis of our empirical data, it appears that these two 
discourses, which had characterized the GP-arena since its origin, increasingly 
become more established and taken for granted, i.e. the normal and appropriate 
way of understanding and considering any CSR policy and SEAR framework. In other 
words, these discourses increasingly became an ‘ought’. In the words of Interviewee 
C, 
“CSR has to be voluntary from our point of view. It is either voluntary or it is not 
really a concept that works in [any] political context. The challenge [is] to 
promote CSR respecting its voluntary nature without adding extra administrative 
burdens to business” (emphasis added).              
This emphasis on a voluntary approach and in favour of business interests became 
even more evident towards the end of this period when the Commission launched 
the European Alliance for CSR, and issued a second policy document (European 
Commission, 2006) entitled “New Communication on Corporate Social 
Responsibility”. The tone of this document was anticipated in coverage by the 
Financial Times:
“The European Commission plans to side with business in largely excluding 
trade unions and non-governmental groups from a new European corporate 
social responsibility initiative” (Minder et al., 2006). 
Minder et al., (2006) also quoted Gunter Verheugen, the Industry Commissioner as 
follows:
"Originally the Commission's plans looked very different. The department 
responsible wanted to publish naming-and-shaming lists (of companies) and 
to create a monitoring system for the implementation of the CSR principles. I 
had to halt this enthusiasm for new regulations." 
In sum, by the end of 2006, therefore, these discourses about the ‘business case for 
CSR’ and the ‘voluntary approach to CSR’ seemed to have become largely dominant. 
From our theoretical perspective, these discourses represented, and acted as, forms 
of systemic power, which “defined”, “delimited” and “restricted” (Lawrence and 
Buchanan, 2017; Lawrence, 2008) the course of actions and initiatives of available to 
the actors in the GP-arena.             
      
5.2. Episodic Power initiatives to influence the GP-arena 
In this subsection, we examine the episodic power initiatives which were deployed 
by NGOs and business groups to influence the dynamics in the GP-arena. In 
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particular, we focus on: i) the discursive strategies; and ii) other approaches such as 
lobbying initiatives undertaken, moral suasion and coalition building. As noted 
above, our analysis of the discursive strategies employed in the lobbying process is 
informed by Vaara and Tienari (2008) and Vaara et al., (2006, p.797), who distinguish 
between five “discursive legitimation strategies”; (i) Rationalization; (ii) Moral 
Evaluation; (iii) Authorization; (iv) Normalization (as a separate category of 
authorization); and (v) Mythopoesis (or narrativisation). Although we saw evidence 
of each of these strategies in our analysis, we focus our discussion here on the four 
where the evidence is strongest: rationalization, moral evaluation, authorization and 
normalization. In addition, we highlight evidence of other episodic power initiatives 
such as lobbying, moral suasion and coalition building.
Rationalization
According to Vaara and Tienari (2008, p.988) and Vaara et al., (2006, p.800), 
rationalization is a strategy of legitimisation that refers to the utility of an action or 
the expected outcome. Within the context of responses to the GP, this strategy was 
frequently employed in the submissions made by companies, who tended to 
emphasise both a “business case” for CSR policy and SEAR and the utility of a 
voluntary approach. In fact, companies were generally enthusiastic about their own 
capacity to make a meaningful contribution to CSR development, but only under 
conditions of voluntary guidelines. Many of their comments described voluntary 
regulation as important for company motivation and responsibility. One example of 
this was found in a submission by Lloyd’s TSB:
“There is frequently a business motivation, particularly in relation to 
social policy, and this helps explain the willingness of companies to go 
beyond mere compliance.”
For instance, Lloyd’s TSB argued that “the essential driver for business engaging in 
CSR [reporting] practice, let alone its evaluation and verification, will be the 
business case”. These comments were echoed by Interviewee D, who, reflecting on 
whether there was a business case for voluntary CSR and SEAR, emphasized a 
rationalization-based argument according to which “there is a business case… 
[related to some] competitive advantage for those who have taken this strategy”.
Many company submissions favoured voluntary regulation on the basis of its 
“flexibility”.  More specifically, it was frequently claimed that such flexibility was the 
driving force behind the corporate adoption of CSR and SEAR practices. Companies 
argued that the huge variety of business sectors, sizes and business environments 
made voluntary regulation expedient. For example, Barclays suggested that CSR 
“[i]ssues can be subjective, intangible and … difficult to address properly through a 
‘one size fits all’ framework.” British Telecom’s response indicated that firms 
“would also like to see the EU emphasise the need to build up trust relationships 
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with suppliers in the implementation of codes, and this requires a company- or 
industry -specific, rather than ‘one size fits all’, approach to implementation”24.  
In the above examples, a rationalization strategy is being employed as a basis of 
establishing legitimacy, through the implication that wider social welfare would 
benefit from a voluntary approach to policy and reporting – since such an approach 
could (more efficiently) accommodate: (i) the inherent subjectivity of CSR (see also, 
Fairbrass, 2011) and (ii) the inherently different contexts in which companies and 
industries operate.
In contrast to the generally favorable views expressed in relation to voluntary 
regulation, companies’ submissions tended to characterize a mandatory approach as 
both costly and as an impediment to progress in CSR policy and SEAR25. There were 
also the familiar business case arguments against the imposition of mandatory 
regulation. In this sense, a strategy of (de)legitimization was employed. For example, 
concerns were raised about the adverse impact on business’s incentives to adopt 
CSR that could result from forcing a compliance-based regime upon companies. 
Cadbury-Schweppes made the following comment about this potential loss of 
incentive:
“Cadbury Schweppes supports the Commission approach of privileging 
voluntary rather than legislative measures as legislation would result in 
companies trading down to the lowest common denominator instead of 
pushing industry to constantly improve its performance.”
These negative arguments focussed on specific CSR concepts, such as stakeholder 
relations and social dialogue. For example, GlaxoSmithKline UK evidently felt that 
they had already accumulated social capital through the development of their own 
voluntary CSR policy and expressed concern about losing it: “a mandatory scheme 
could undermine the goodwill that is currently the foundation of business’s CSR 
activities, particularly stakeholder engagement.”
Moral Evaluation
According to Vaara and Tienari (2008, p.998) the strategy of moral evaluation seeks 
to establish “legitimation by reference to specific value systems that provide the 
moral basis for legitimation”. For example, one might attempt to establish legitimacy 
by appealing to a rights-based discourse, to fairness (Vaara and Tienari, 2008) or 
even to “national interests” (Vaara et al., 2006, p.801). In relation to the GP, the 
most prevalent and explicit utilizations of this legitimation strategy were to be found 
in the NGO submissions, across a range of arguments. 
24 Recall that interviewee B had suggested “It may have been a [British business] strategy to send 
many responses because they tend to say more or less the same”.  
25 Jackson et al. (2019) is a more recent exploration of the impact of mandatory disclosures on CSR in 
a number of countries, including many from the EU.
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It was clear that NGOs were concerned that CSR should not be used in an 
instrumental way as a marketing tool for financial gain. For example, The Platform of 
European Social NGOs stated this point succinctly when they argued that:
“CSR must not involve rewarding corporations for complying with legal 
obligations … CSR should not be promoted solely on the instrumental 
grounds of economic benefit”.
Relatedly, all NGOs were uneasy about the GP’s business case focus.  For example, 
the New Economics Foundation argued that:
“The focus on the “business case” limits the EU role in ensuring that 
organisations - including public, private and voluntary - take full 
responsibility for their wider impacts on stakeholders and the 
environment”.
The moral legitimation strategy employed by NGOs in their submissions, tended to 
implicitly view corporate responsibility as a duty or end in itself; such a view is 
therefore quite distinct from, and undermined by, a moral discourse which 
emphasises the “business case” or views corporate responsibility as a means to an 
end. In the submissions, Friends of the Earth probably came closest to explicitly 
articulating what they saw as a corporate moral duty, stating that “the benefits of 
publicly-traded status are effectively a substantial subsidy from society to these 
corporations - for which society can expect some return”.
In relation to SEAR more specifically, NGO submissions also employed a legitimation 
strategy grounded on moral evaluation. Specifically, a number of submissions 
alluded to a potential moral conflict of interest that might arise if a commercial 
company were to offer assurance services to another company. For example, Africa 
Now were explicit about the inherent threat to ‘audit r independence’, stating:
“The quality of the verification would be much improved if it were not 
simply the preserve of companies who sold a verification exercise (and 
thus perhaps could be argued to be tempted to provide a favourable 
report) but broadened to NGOs, workers and civil society more 
generally” (emphasis added).
In this respect, a broader role for the NGO sector in acting as a stimulus to 
responsible corporate behaviour was also envisaged: 
 
“The EU should also actively support NGOs and other groups that 
campaign and act as watchdogs on specific issues such as human rights 
or the environment”.
While, on the whole, the most explicit use of this legitimization strategy in the 
submissions was from NGOs, it is worth noting that the strategy of rationalization 
also “has a moral basis, although not always an explicit one” (Vaara et al., 2006, 
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p.801). For example, according to Vaara et al., (2006, p.801) “economic-financial” 
rationalizations that emphasise “growth, economies of scale, efficiency, etc.”, are 
often connected to the moral views that one might associate with “neoliberalism”. 
Similarly, as outlined in the rationalization section above, the companies’ 
submissions to the GP tended to emphasise a voluntary approach to CSR policy and 
SEAR, arguing that minimal government interference and an instrumental approach 
to CSR that would benefit “business interests”.  When companies’ submissions were 
explicit in employing a moral evaluation strategy – they tended to refer to these 
points. For example, BG Group alluded to these issues in their succinct observation: 
“above all, the Commission must steer clear of policies that will add to costs and 
make European firms uncompetitive.”
Authorization
The strategy of authorization seeks to establish legitimacy by making “reference to 
the authority of tradition, custom, law, and persons in whom institutional authority 
of some kind is vested” (Vaara and Tienari, 2008, p.988). While not a prevalent 
strategy with the submissions, there were clearly instances of such a strategy. For 
example, it was employed in the negative in order to question the legitimacy, 
jurisdiction and authority of the EU vis-à-vis CSR. In this sense, for example, a 
number of submissions suggested that the EU was not an appropriate forum for 
dealing with global issues. Kellogg’s submission argued that CSR had to be dealt with 
at a higher jurisdictional level than the EU because “[t]he nature of CSR means that it 
needs to be seen in both a global and local context”. Morley Fund Management 
agreed with this view; their submission suggested that “[a]n overly prescriptive 
approach to CSR policy and reporting in Europe could also cause problems with 
integrating internationally.” In other words, some companies’ submissions framed 
CSR as a complex global issue, which was beyond the EU’s jurisdictional authority.
The most common expression of this strategy of authorization came from companies 
through an appeal, either explicitly or implicitly, to the authority of “the market”. 
This is exemplified by the submission from Telephonica who stated, “the market will 
decide which companies are more credible”. This appeal to the authority of the 
market is closely linked to another, more common, legitimation strategy; more 
specifically, a number of the company submissions employed a rationalization 
strategy that highlighted the “business case” for CSR – as discussed above. It could 
be argued that the authority of the market is implicit in such rationalizations. 
Normalization
Vaara and Tienari (2008, p.988) designate normalization “as a separate category of 
authorization” or, as Vaara et al., (2006, p.797) describe it, “a fact-of-life 
rationalization” which “rend[ers] the case at hand as something ‘normal’”.
Many comments in the submissions highlighted the problem of defining good CSR 
practices across a wide range of businesses and countries. For example, General 
Motors (Europe) argued that “a prescriptive approach in this respect is inappropriate 
as CSR means a great many things to many people”. NIKE agreed arguing that it was 
“too early in the global debate to be able to define precisely the formal roles that 
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each stakeholder should or could play and that it would be premature and 
constraining to attempt to formalize roles within the framework of the social 
dialogue.” Similarly, Innogy argued that requiring assurance on SEAR and related 
reports would be problematic, because standard metrics would not capture the 
complexity of CSR. They stated: “given the wide range of impacts that such 
verification would need to cover this may be difficult to address through a 
sta dardised set of metrics” (emphasis added).  What is being rendered as normal in 
these examples is that CSR is “complex” – and that such complexity is simply a “fact-
of-life” about CSR.
By contrast, NGOs did not view CSR policy and SEAR regulation as out of the ordinary 
and drew attention to the long tradition of regulation on related matters. For 
example, Friends of the Earth argued that: “[f]rom the end of slavery to health and 
safety standards, corporations have been required to act in ways deemed to be in 
the public interest”.  
Other episodic power initiatives including lobbying, moral suasion and coalition 
building
As noted by Lawrence and Buchanan (2017) and Lawrence (2008), lobbying 
represents a powerful initiative for influencing the behaviour of other individuals 
and/or groups. From this perspective, therefore, lobbying represents a form of 
“episodic power”, which can be strategically mobilized to affect the dynamics of the 
GP-arena. According to Interviewee A, the EU CSR initiative was 
“a very heavily lobbied issue. Lobbying takes place heavily here in Brussels all the 
time anyway, on every issue. This is one of them which business is highly sensitive 
to…Of course lobbying has been performed by others, not least by campaigning 
groups”. 
As added by another Interviewee (C) the attempts of lobbying “from different groups 
… in whatever form they make take [was] very strong” (emphasis added). From the 
analysis of our empirical data, it appears that the GP arena, from its inception, was 
the focus of strong lobbying activity, undertaken by different groups including 
business groups and NGOs. As emphasized by Interviewee B,
 
“We have the same people lobbying MEPs and European Commission officials and 
also Commissioners. Everybody. There is a whole industry in Brussels about this. 
The best way of [doing] it is through [multiple] initiatives”. 
In the context of our analysis, these multiple lobbying initiatives included: requests 
for formal and informal meetings; sending letters and reports; written responses to 
the GP; invitations to specific thematic conferences and forms of moral suasion 
through Public Relations offices. However, not all of these were considered to be 
equally effective in shaping the GP-arena. For example, according to Interviewee B, 
an effective form of lobbying is through 
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“meetings. We receive so many papers. Opinions that are submitted in writing are 
easier to dismiss. If you have one hour with someone, you are forced to have a 
dialogue with them. If they [lobbyists] want information they call you on the 
phone, but when they want to make their point they ask for an appointment”.
Similar considerations are reported by Interviewee C, who explained that: 
“written documents are not as effective as face to face meetings. I think you are 
likely to remember in a face to face meeting what was said in it, more than in a 
written document”.        
Our analysis suggests that several face-to-face meetings were requested and 
organized by business groups and NGOs to seek to influence the decisions of the 
EU’s institutions, and therefore the dynamics of the GP-arena. These meetings were 
relevant because they created alternative “channels of dialogue” (Scott, 1995) 
between actors in the GP-arena through which to persuade and exert moral suasion. 
In addition to the face-to-face meetings, two other initiatives seemed to play a 
pivotal role in the GP-arena: a) conferences and workshops; b) coalition building.
Several conferences and workshops were organized to discuss the EU CSR policy. 
Some of these conferences, which were organized by interested groups or their 
representatives (e.g. Confederation of British Industry), were also used as platforms 
to express criticisms of EU institutional actors or to create wider consensus. As 
reported by Interviewee A, who took part in one of these specific conferences,
“the EU Committee for the US Chamber of Commerce, for example, held a special 
conference following the [CSR] White Paper where they invited me. They wrote 
some very critical things about our [Directorate’s] position and my own position, 
but I was very happy to go up there and have tomatoes thrown at myself”.
From the theoretical perspective of this paper, these thematic conferences on the 
EU CSR policy and reporting framework represented other ‘alternative’ forms and 
centres of dialogue and discussion, through which to influence the dynamics in the 
GP-arena. 
 
With regard to point b) coalition building, the emergence and evolution of the GP-
arena were also characterized by attempts to build alliances between members 
within each interested group, such as business groups and NGOs. For example, CSR 
Europe (i.e. the lobbying organisation for CSR) played an important role in 
influencing the GP-arena because it promoted a stronger pro-business stance for CSR 
policy and SEAR. In particular, it was seen, and acted, as an influential representative 
of business in the context of the GP-arena. According to Interviewee D
“The business organisations were represented by this CSR Europe construct… This 
was an interesting beast. They were very much pushing the business case 
argument. CSR Europe coordinated the group” (emphasis added).
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Our analysis shows that business groups adopted coalition building as a specific 
strategy to mobilize resources to influence the dynamics in the GP-arena. Similar 
attempts were also undertaken by NGOs. However, such attempts, we argue, at 
coalition-building between NGOs and other non-business constituents (e.g. 
European Trade Unions) were not as effective as those taken by business (see also 
Fairbrass, 2011). Interviewee D, who was actively involved in these NGO attempts, 
noted: 
“We did engage with the formal process of the [GP], but we also engaged 
informally, through the G8 in terms of producing papers circulated to MEPs and 
Commissioners and so forth at different stages in the process. We actually spent 
most of the latter part of the formal process trying to persuade most of the NGOs 
to gather around to pull out of it…So the dynamic was that, there were two or 
three NGOs that were prepared to be stroppy; six or seven wanting to engage or 
be annoyed depending on what was on the agenda. The European Trade Union 
Confederation prepared to talk as a means to negotiate something: [but was 
clearly too dependent on maintaining a good relationship with the Commission 
and] in the end never prepared to back out”.
Therefore, from our empirical analysis, it appears that, unlike business groups, there 
was lack of consensus between NGOs, and between NGOs and other civil society 
groups, about the vision, strategy and approach to adopt with regard to the 
consultation processes, which started with the publication of the GP. In particular, 
while business groups seemed more united about the need to support the business 
case for CSR through a voluntary reporting and verification framework, NGOs and 
other civil society groups appeared fragmented and divergent. 
6. Conclusions
This paper examines the institutional politics associated with the regulatory arena 
that emerged out of the European Commission’s GP on CSR, which was issued in 
2001 as an attempt to “regulate” CSR and SEAR activities. As already outlined, this 
regulatory arena denoted a specific example of an institutional arena, i.e. the 
symbolic location of discussions, interactions and actio s that characterize the 
several actors involved in the arena’s debated issue. Our analysis, in particular, 
explores the competing power-infused strategies and initiatives employed by two 
key actors in the arena (business groups and NGOs) which sought to influence the 
outcome of the debate in terms of the definition, problematisation and suggested 
solutions for the issue related to whether any CSR framework and associated SEAR 
should be voluntary or mandatory. Drawing on Lawrence and Buchanan’s (2017) and 
Lawrence’s (2008) notions of systemic power (exerted through domination or 
discipline) and episodic power (where actors mobilise resources to affect the 
behaviours of others through force and influence), the present paper investigates 
the strategies of business groups and NGOs in the arena, which emerged from the 
GP which was published in 2001 (GP-arena). Newspaper articles and other related 
literature about this issue (from 2001 to 2006) were analysed using a themes-based 
protocol to study the forms of systemic power, which characterised the arena: the 
institutional context in which the GP-arena emerged/evolved; how the actors 
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responded; and the ongoing practices that delimited the options available to the 
actors. A discourse-informed content analysis of companies and NGO submissions on 
the GP as well as a protocol analysis of transcripts from a small number of interviews 
were employed to examine instances of episodic power.
Our empirical analysis shows that the GP issued by the Commission in July 2001 was 
the “triggering event” (Hoffman, 1999), i.e. the catalyst that led to the formation of 
the institutional arena. Our findings reveal that this triggering event was 
characterised and supplemented by two emerging discourses related to CSR and 
SEAR; one prioritised the voluntary nature of CSR while the other highlighted the 
benefits to business of CSR. These two connected – and dominant (Archel et al., 
2011) - discourses emerged early on in the process and formed the background 
against which subsequent NGOs’ and companies’ initiatives attempted to shape the 
dynamics of the GP-arena. Such framing of the debate reflects successful 
‘endogenization’ (Bozanic et al., 2012) of the regulatory process by those who were 
to be regulated.
During the period from 2002 to 2004, the GP-arena went through a process of 
restructuring which was affected by three main factors: the publication of the 
Communication on CSR: A Business Contribution to Sustainable Development in July 
2002; the emergence of the EU Multi-Stakeholder Forum in October 2002; and the 
change in the complexion of the Commission. These three events modified the 
structure and contours of the GP-arena, by re-defining who could take part in the 
debate and re-enforcing the voluntary focus of the CSR and SEAR proposals. As a 
result, the existing discourse about a voluntary approach to CSR and SEAR, which 
revolved around the interests of business, seemed to attract more support and 
became more established and taken-for-granted with other views being crowded 
out or excluded. From our theoretical perspective, these discourses represented 
forms of systemic power, which “defined”, “delimited” and “restricted” (Lawrence 
and Buchanan, 2017; Lawrence, 2008) the course of actions and initiatives of the 
actors in the GP-arena.   
 
We also found evidence for different examples of episodic power among initiatives 
adopted by NGOs and business groups to influence the dynamics of the GP-arena. In 
particular, the discursive strategy of rationalization was frequently employed in 
companies’ submissions on the GP where the business case and the merits as well as 
the flexibility of a voluntary approach to SEAR were often mentioned. By contrast, 
NGOs tended to use a strategy of moral evaluation by appealing to notions of 
fairness and the national interest when promoting the case for regulations 
mandating CSR and SEAR among corporations. There was also a greater degree of 
convergence among the discourses supplied by business groups. This was apparent 
in the explanations provided, the language used and the rationales supplied for the 
business case for SEAR and CSR. The same level of consensus and coherence was not 
present among the discourses of the NGOs. Further, companies were more 
successful at building coalitions to support their discourse than the NGOs. From our 
theoretical perspective, this fragmentation and divergence of views among the 
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NGOs did not seem to provide the necessary institutional resources to challenge the 
initiatives undertaken by business groups and influence this aspect of the GP-arena.
    
The success of business groups in advancing their collective view can be inferred 
from the following perspective of one of the participants26 in the wider debate 
within the EU which ensued after the initial GP proposals appeared.
“The Commission ultimately decided to opt-out from the debate, producing a 
Communication firmly backing an anti-regulation approach. Commissioners 
held a series of private meetings with selected company representatives to 
negotiate on the text of the Communication, then described it as "agreed" by 
business, and only met personally with interested NGOs to discuss its contents 
following on from publication. The key Commission official responsible for CSR 
appears to have been moved from his job, perhaps to make way for this new 
‘consensus’. A leaked memo from the European employers’ organisation 
UNICE described the Communication as a "true success" because "concessions 
to other stakeholders... will have no real impact".” (Howitt, 2006, p.12).
Our paper provides three main contributions. First, our analysis adds to the existing 
literature on CSR policy and SEAR regulation at the EU level by shedding light on the 
power-related dynamics through which these CSR policy and SEAR frameworks 
emerge and develop. In particular, our analysis provides a more detailed account of 
the different levels of power and strategies (e.g. lobbying, discursive strategies), 
which can be mobilised by the various interested stakeholders to shape and 
influence the processes and outcome of CSR and SEAR-related regulative 
interventions. Hence, our empirical analysis helps to illuminate some of the often-
opaque mechanisms that drive and influence the regulation of accounting, and in 
particular, of SEAR practices. Second, our paper provides a theoretical contribution 
by enhancing the understanding of the institutional politics dynamics involved in a 
specific arena. In particular, our analysis enriches the theoretical framework 
proposed by Lawrence and Buchanan (2017) by adding empirical “flesh” to the 
understanding of “how” and “why” specific institutional arenas are shaped and 
change over time (Holm, 1995; Stryker, 2000). In particular, our analysis highlights 
the relevance of the different “discursive strategies” (e.g. rationalization) in driving 
changes in specific institutional arenas (Phillips et al., 2004). Finally, our paper 
provides a contribution to the literature that focuses on the “emergence”, “design” 
and “organizing” of economic regulation and related activities (Hancher and Moran, 
1989; Scott, 2004). In particular, our findings reveal how these processes related to 
the economic regulation activities are influenced by several institutional/contextual 
factors (e.g. changes in the political complexion of the European Commission; the 
emergence and taken-for-grantedness of specific business oriented discourses) 
which provide the institutional resources and opportunities for the formation of a 
specific issue-centred regulatory space. The analysis of these factors help us to 
understand ‘how’ and ‘why’ certain dynamics that characterise the organisations’ 
26 Richard Howitt MEP was the European Parliament’s spokesperson on Corporate Social 
Responsibility.
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activities in a regulatory space occur. It is through an understanding of these 
complex dynamics that it is possible to enhance the process of rule-making and 
regulation by ensuring that this is made more visible, transparent and oriented to 
society’s needs. 
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Table 1. An institutional politics framework for examining the GP-Arena: Concepts and definitions
CONCEPTS AND ELEMENTS DEFINITIONS AS APPLIED TO THIS PAPER
INSTITUTIONS
“Enduring patterns of social practices, which 
are characterized by power-based control 
mechanisms, that regulate, influence and 
shape individual/organisational behaviours 
and thoughts. Institutions emerge from social 
constructed mechanisms and debates” 
(Lawrence 2008; Phillips et al., 2004)
EU CSR & SEAR
(REGULATORY) FRAMEWORK 
(Green Paper 2001)
INSTITUTIONAL FIELDS
“A community of several organisations that 
partakes of the definition and understanding 
of institutions. Institutional fields emerge 
around different types of centre: markets, 
industries, regulation activities and contested 
issues” (Hoffman, 1999).
CENTRE OF DEBATE 
WHETHER CSR & SEAR 
FRAMEWORK SHOULD BE 
VOLUNTARY OR MANDATORY 
“Fields represent arenas of power relations 
where multiple constituents, with disparate 
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INSTITUTIONAL FIELDS AS ARENAS purposes and interests, interact and compete 
over the formation of the field. These power-
infused dynamics represent the institutional 
politics of an arena” (Lawrence & Buchanan, 
2017).
INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF 
THE GP-ARENA
INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
They represent the strategic mobilization of 
material and symbolic resources through 
which individual, group and organisational 
actors affect arenas’ dynamics. Institutional 
politics involves two power-based dynamics: 
i) institutional control; and ii) institutional 
agency (Stryker, 2000; Lawrence & 
Buchanan, 2017).
POWER-INFUSED DYNAMICS 
OF THE GP-ARENA
POWER-BASED DYNAMICS OF AN 
ARENA
A) INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL
B) INSTITUTIONAL AGENCY
A) INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTROL:  The 
established socio-
economic discourses of 
the existing institutional 
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context which affected 
GP-arena dynamics;
B) INSTITUTIONAL 
AGENCY: discursive 
strategies and lobbying 
initiatives
The Table provides a summary of the theoretical concepts which have been used in this paper. In particular, the Table provides 
a definition (in the second column) of: i) institutions; ii) institutional field; iii) institutional arena; iv) institutional politics and related 
power-infused dynamics. In the third column we clarify how these concepts have been applied to the present paper. 
Page 39 of 48 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal
Table 2. The institutional politics of an institutional arena: the interplay between systemic 
and episodic forms of power
INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: DYNAMICS, MODES, FORMS AND 
STRATEGIES OF POWER
INSTITUTIONAL 
DYNAMICS INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL INSTITUTIONAL AGENCY
MODE OF 
POWER
SYSTEMIC POWER EPISODIC POWER
FORMS OF 
POWER
DISCIPLINE DOMINATION INFLUENCE
FORCE
POWER-
INFUSED 
STRATEGIES
Disciplinary 
systems and 
techniques 
(e.g. 
voluntary 
profit-sharing 
plan)
 Physical and 
social 
systems;
 Technology;
 Established 
economic and 
social 
practices and 
discourses 
(e.g. 
economic 
growth).
 Corporate 
sponsorship
 Moral and rational 
persuasion
 Legitimation 
initiatives
 Lobbying for 
regulatory change
 Discursive 
strategies
 Physical forms 
of force (e.g. 
prison)
 Bureaucratic 
forms of force 
(e.g. 
procedures for 
firing 
employees)
POWER-
INFUSED 
The established 
socio-economic 
discourses of 
the existing 
 Discursive 
strategies: 
authorization, 
rationalisation, 
Out of the scope 
of this paper
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INITIATIVES IN 
THE GP-ARENA
Out of the 
scope of this 
paper
institutional 
context, e.g. the 
essential social 
role of 
corporations and 
the urgency for a 
CSR-related 
agenda.
moral evaluation, 
normalization. 
 Lobbying 
initiatives by 
business groups 
and NGOs
 Influencing 
through for 
example the 
European Multi-
Stakeholder 
Forum
Developed from Lawrence and Buchanan (2017)
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Table 3. Data sources for the study
Phase Data source
All English Language Newspapers in Nexis database1
4 Interviews with key participants during the first half of 2005
Interviewee Perspective Gender Location
A MEP M Brussels
B European 
Commission
M Brussels
C Europe n 
Commission
M Brussels
D NGO M UK
2 Business and NGO submissions on Green Paper (see Table 3 for further detail)
4 Interviews as above
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Table 4. GP submissions
PANEL A: ALL GP SUBMISSIONS
REVIEWED NOT 
REVIEWED
TOTAL
Language of 
submission
Companies NGOs Other
Dutch 1 1 1 3
English 40 25 138 203
French 6 6 16 28
German 0 1 9 10
Italian 1 0 7 8
Portuguese 0 0 1 1
Spanish 2 2 9 13
TOTAL 50 35 181 266
PANEL B: FREQUENCY OF RELEVANT COMMENTS IN REVIEWED 
SUBMISSIONS
Companies NGOs TOTAL
Number (%age) of 
submissions commenting 
on ‘reporting’
43 (82) 27 (77) 70 (82)
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Number (%age) of 
submissions commenting 
on ‘assurance’
34 (68) 25 (71) 59 (69)
Number (%age) of 
submissions commenting 
on regulation
50 (100) 32 (91) 82 (96)
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